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HAVE WE NO SHAME?:  THOUGHTS ON
SHAMING, “WHITE COLLAR” CRIMINALS,




Like the stocks and pillories of colonial times, public
embarrassment has returned as a popular means of punishment.
Judge Judy leads a pack of “real life” courtroom dramas securing
spectacular ratings by using nationwide humiliation to punish the
losing party,1 and now real courts are getting into the act.  More and
more frequently, judges are using bumper stickers, billboards, T-
shirts, and even community access television to publicize a
defendant’s transgressions.2  As Jerry Lee Lewis might say, there’s a
whole lot of shaming going on.
Some of legal academia’s brightest stars have jumped on the shame
train, arguing that modern versions of the dunce cap, rather than
shackles, best fit the “white collar” criminal.  The influential Dan
Kahan, one of shaming’s biggest supporters, has proposed that it
                                                                
∗ Associate, O’Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1993, University of
California at Berkeley; J.D., 1996, Stanford Law School.  Prior to joining O’Melveny &
Myers, the author clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the Supreme Court of
the United States and prosecuted “white collar” criminals for the Justice Department.
He now represents “white collar” defendants.  He thanks George Fisher, Jonathan
Hacker, Paul Horwitz, and especially Marjorie D. Purcell for their advice and
assistance.  He also thanks the American University Law Review for its fine work.
1. See Marc Gunther, The Little Judge Who Kicked Oprah’s Butt:  Daytime Television’s
Hottest Property, FORTUNE, May 10, 1999, at 32 (noting the meteoric rise in popularity
of Judge Judy Sheindlin’s courtroom television show and books, which demonstrates
a “no-baloney, common-sense approach to the law”).  Judge Judy “lectures litigants
on everything from good behavior to proper grooming” and does not hesitate to tell
parties that they “both acted like idiots.”  Id.
2. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591,
631-33 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions].
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become a regular part of the sentencing process and replace
incarceration as the penalty for many “white collar” offenders under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).  According to
Kahan, shaming is more efficient than incarceration because it
provides the same level of deterrence while requiring less of society’s
resources.3  He argues that the Guidelines, which Congress designed
to limit disparities in sentencing, currently prevent federal district
court judges from using shame to punish “white collar” offenders.4
Yet, in his efforts to reintroduce shaming into the sentencing process,
Kahan ignores the shame that already exists in the current federal
criminal justice system.  Federal government attorneys and federal
judges routinely employ shaming devices when prosecuting and
sentencing “white collar” criminals, including the very shaming
sanction that Kahan urges the Sentencing Commission to adopt.5
This Essay challenges Kahan’s positions and presumptions about
shaming, “white collar” criminals, and the Guidelines.  Part I outlines
Kahan’s position on shaming, why he believes it is the answer for
“white collar” criminals, and his proposed changes to the Guidelines.
Part II argues that “white collar” criminals do not fit into the “one
size fits all” model that Kahan uses to promote shaming.  Part III
illustrates how the Guidelines provide federal district court judges
with ample discretion to fashion unique conditions to deter these
criminals, including the shaming that Kahan proposes.
I. SHAMING AND KAHAN
In a series of articles, Professor Dan Kahan defines and advocates
shaming as an alternative means of punishment.6  He cites several
                                                                
3. See id. at 635 (explaining that shaming penalties are growing in popularity
because they are less expensive than imprisonment and provide different ways to
punish the same offenses as well as offenses that otherwise would not be punished).
But see Toni M. Massaro, The Meaning of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 650 (1997) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame Implications] (“Shame is
central to individual emotional development, and doubtless influences the creation
and enforcement of social norms; but governmental attempts to manipulate and
exploit shame through public humiliation rituals may be far more complicated,
costly, and counterproductive than the [shame] reformers seem to appreciate.”).
4. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:  A Proposal
For Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1880, 1885-86 (1991) [hereinafter Massaro, Shame] (stating that shaming has
already occurred in the form of “furlough programs, community service sentences,
home surveillance systems, . . . shock probation, forced charitable contributions,
chemical therapy, forced birth control, and . . . castration”).
6. Kahan has presented his shaming arguments in the following: Dan M. Kahan,
Unthinkable Misrepresentations:  A Response to Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1933, 1935
(1999); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 617 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
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contemporary examples, including the City of Hoboken’s practice of
advertising the identities of individuals convicted of public urination
as well as requiring that these offenders clean the city’s streets.7
Kahan uses these examples and anecdotes as the background for
defining shaming.  “Shaming is the process by which citizens publicly
and self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions
of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those
dispositions or engaging in those activities.”8  According to Kahan,
there are four variants of shaming that provide sufficient deterrence
to white collar crime offenders.  First, stigmatizing publicity includes
penalties that “attempt to magnify the humiliation inherent in
conviction by communicating the offender’s status to a wider
audience.”9  Hoboken’s publication of public urinators’ identities in
local newspapers is an example of this first category.10  Second, literal
stigmatization involves “the stamping of an offender with a mark or
symbol that invites ridicule.”11  Common examples include requiring
offenders to wear T-shirts or signs proclaiming their crimes.12  Third,
self-debasement concerns “[c]eremonies or rituals that publicly disgrace
the offender.”13  Hoboken’s requirement that public urinators also
clean the City’s streets exemplifies this variant.  Finally, contrition
always involves a description of the crime and a public apology, such
as an executive apologizing for his company’s pollution of a local
river.14
Kahan prefers shaming over incarceration due to its efficiency.
First, he explains that “[w]hite-collar offenders do not pose physical
threats to others; the threat they pose consists of their ability to gain
the confidence of a victim and then cheat him.”15  If the federal
government effectively shames the “white collar” offender, then
“everyone knows or can easily discover that the offender is a bad
                                                                                                                                                     
REV. 691, 704-06 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 384-85 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal
Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1639-43 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and
Sociology:  The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2483-84 (1997); Kahan,
Alternative Sanctions, supra note 2.
7. Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 365-67.  Kahan offers other examples,
including a slumlord in New York who was sentenced to live in one of his own
buildings with a banner reading “Welcome Reptile.”  Id.
8. Id. at 368.
9. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 2, at 631-32.
10. Other examples include televising offenders’ crimes on community access
television.  Id.
11. Id. at 632.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 633.
14. See id. at 631-34.
15. Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 371.
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type.”16  The offender is effectively incapacitated because the general
public will avoid him.  Thus, it would be as though the offender walks
around surrounded by bars.  In addition, traditional sentencing
options such as imprisonment carry much higher societal costs than
shaming.17  Finally, the harm to an offender’s reputation is also why
shaming is more effective than monetary fines.  Even though a
defendant frequently can pay fines and ultimately continue his
business, “shaming directly destroys an asset that the fine cannot
destroy—the offender’s reputation.”18  In other words, a publicly
destroyed reputation puts a “white collar” criminal out of business,
for potential victims know to steer clear of the offender and his
schemes.
According to Kahan, the Guidelines do not permit federal judges
sufficient latitude to shame the defendant as part of the sentence.19
Therefore, Kahan proposes incorporation of a special hybrid penalty
“consisting of a fixed shaming component and a variable fine
component.”20  The fixed shaming component would permit a judge
to order a “white collar” defendant, at his own expense, “in the
format and media specified by the court, to publicize the nature of
the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the
punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the
recurrence of similar offenses.”21  The amount of the fine would vary




19. See id. at 384 (discussing how the Guidelines eliminate variability in
sentencing).
20. Id. at 385-86.
21. Id. at 385 (discussing FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(a)
(1999)).  Guideline § 8D1.4(a) permits a district court to require an offending
corporation to publicize its crimes.  FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4
(1999).  This section went into effect on November 1, 1991. Id.  For a review of
articles discussing section 8D1.4(a), see Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in
Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 960-1007 (1999) (discussing the
“corporate icon” provision, which provides that a sentencing judge may require the
chief executive officer to appear personally in court to receive the corporation’s
punishment for violating federal laws); Cynthia E. Carrasco & Michael K. Dupee,
Corporate Criminal Liability, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445, 462 (1999) (outlining the
possible terms of probation and the imposition of fines by federal courts); Andrew
Cowan, Scarlet Letters for Corporations?  Punishment by Publicity Under the New Sentencing
Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387, 2387-420 (1992) (analyzing the sentencing
guidelines for organizational crimes that require public disclosure of the conviction);
Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity—An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 361-62 (1996) (describing public notification sanctions);
Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines:  Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 320-24 (1993) (reviewing the sentencing
guidelines’ support for organizations paying for their own adverse publicity that
results from their convictions); Martin Harrell, Organizational Environmental Crime and
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984:  Combining Fines with Restitution, Remedial Orders,
Community Service, and Probation to Benefit the Environment While Punishing the Guilty, 6
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with the severity of the crime, “conserv[ing] the rational
proportionality of the current Guidelines regime.”22  According to
Kahan, this hybrid system would provide the same amount of
deterrence as incarceration for “white collar” criminals, but at a
much lower societal price.23
II. SHAMING AND “WHITE COLLAR” CRIMINALS
Kahan never defines “white collar” criminals.  Before deciding how
society generally and the Guidelines specifically should define and
punish white collar criminals, it is very important to recognize that
such criminals are far more complex and diverse than the
stereotypical “grifters” that Kahan uses as his model.24  For example,
“white collar” criminals often harm more than the checkbooks of
their victims.  Hospital patients whose computer medical records
have been erased by hackers,25 families of the victims of the ValuJet
crash,26 and consumers who purchase bogus HIV self-test kits over the
Internet27 would disagree with Kahan’s assertion that “[w]hite collar
offenders do not pose physical threats to others.”28
In addition, contrary to Kahan’s contentions, many, if not most,
“white collar” criminals do not need “to gain the confidence of a
victim and then cheat him” to succeed.29  Computer hackers and
other “white collar” criminals, such as identity thieves and individuals
who covertly access telephone networks to make unauthorized phone
calls, perfect their crafts without first befriending prospective
victims.30  The ever-growing “white collar” crime service industry,
                                                                                                                                                     
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 266 (1995) (providing the history of Section Eight’s use of
alternative sanctions); Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2031-32 (1992) (identifying
common examples of probation under the sentencing guidelines).
22. Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 386-87.
23. See id. at 371.
24. See JIM THOMPSON, THE GRIFTERS 33-40 (1963) (depicting the classic image of
a con man who survives with small face-to-face swindles).
25. See Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 937-
38 (1996) (describing hospitals in Britain, Italy and the United States that lost vital
patient records, including hematology reports and AIDS records, due to computer
hacking).
26. See Martha Brannigan, SabreTech Convicted of 9 Charges in Trial Related to ValuJet
Crash, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A4 (reporting that SabreTech, Inc., was convicted
of nine felony charges for mishandling hazardous oxygen canisters that caused the
crash of a ValuJet airplane in 1996).
27. See Bogus HIV Test Kits, GRAY SHEET, Feb. 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL
10789446 (describing the conviction of a man sentenced to 63 months in prison for
“fraudulently marketing and selling unapproved and medically useless HIV test kits
for home use”).
28. Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 371.
29. See id.
30. For articles discussing the problems of identity fraud and responsive
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which ranges from money laundering to automobile title washing,
also operates without first gaining the confidence of prospective
victims.  Environmental criminals do not “trick” a lake before
dumping toxins into it.  In addition, many “white collar” criminals
view governmental shaming as a badge of honor.  For example,
government identification and condemnation of a computer hacker
often inspires the hacker to continue her destruction, and others to
follow her lead.31
With existing technology, even those white collar criminals who
rely upon gaining “the confidence of a victim” succeed despite
shaming.  For instance, telemarketers and Internet scam artists
recreate themselves overnight or use multiple personalities
simultaneously, making the “bars of shaming” transparent at best.32
White collar criminals use shells and fronts to hide their involvement
from the victim completely.  Better yet, they steal someone else’s
good reputation via identity theft and use it to gain the trust of a new
batch of victims.33  After all, the best paper criminals never appear on
the incriminating papers.  The con man’s job is to con, and no
matter how much society tars and feathers him, he will devise some
scheme to cut through the “bars of shame” and defraud new,
unsuspecting victims.  As Toni Massaro has pointed out, the more
diverse and sprawling our society becomes, the less it relies upon
close personal interaction to function, and thus the less effective
shaming becomes.34  Thus, reinstituting shaming wholesale may deter
                                                                                                                                                     
legislation, see Kristen S. Provenza, Identity Theft:  Prevention and Liability, 3 N.C.
BANKING INST. 319, 319-36 (1999) (explaining that the victims of identity theft do not
know they are being harmed until after the fact because there is no criminal-victim
contact); Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998:  Do
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?,  11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 165-73
(1999) (discussing the effects of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
on victims of identity theft).
31. For example, the devastating “I Love You” computer virus was followed by
numerous copy cat viruses.  See, e.g., Carolyn Said, “Love Bug” Suspect Sought In
Philippines; Copycats Strike, S.F. CHRON., May 6, 2000, at A1.
32. See, e.g., Margaret Mannix, Bidder Beware, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 27,
1999, at 58 (describing Internet scam artists).
33. See supra note 30.
34. See Massaro, Shame, supra note 5, at 1921 (“The cultural conditions of
effective shaming seem weakly present, at best, in many contemporary American
cities.”); Massaro, Shame Implications, supra note 3, at 693-94 (“The cultural conditions
that so many shaming advocates claim have eroded and hope would be restored by a
greater emphasis on shame, are the very conditions necessary to any effective revival
of public shame practices.  Thus the likely general deterrence effects of shaming too
are doubtful in many modern settings, especially major urban centers.”).  But see
James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055,
1063-68 (1998) (rejecting Massaro’s modernity argument and noting that “[t]he
argument from modernity rests on a questionable notion of shame, one that reduces
it too casually to an emotion experienced only when we are under the direct gaze of
others . . . .”).
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some “white collar” criminals, but certainly not the vast majority of
them.35
III. SHAMING AND THE GUIDELINES
Assuming that shaming deters some “white collar” criminals, it
appears that Kahan’s proposal is ineffective because it adds little to
the shaming that currently exists under the Guidelines.  The criminal
process is an inherently public and humiliating experience.  Federal
criminal cases often begin with a search of the defendant’s home or
business, a very public event.  The defendant’s family, neighbors, and
business associates quickly realize that something is amiss.  So, too,
does the media, which often publicizes the search warrant with its
accompanying affidavit.  A grand jury convenes, and friends, family,
and co-workers may be subpoenaed to testify.  Even though grand
jury proceedings generally are secret, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e) does not require witnesses to remain quiet about
what transpired, and many do not.36  The next step in a contested
criminal case is the Indictment, a public document that often
describes the alleged crimes in considerable detail.  Many U.S.
Attorney Offices issue press releases and brief the media on the
Grand Jury’s decision in a case. Often an arrest quickly follows the
Indictment, an event that U.S. Attorneys (including former U.S.
Attorney Rudy Giuliani) have used as an orchestrated walk of shame
before the media.37  Soon thereafter, the notice of first appearance
and arraignment, also a press-covered public event, follows.  After
discovery and pretrial motions comes the trial, a designedly public
spectacle that is sure to humiliate the defendant regardless of the
jury’s conclusions as to guilt or innocence.
Defendants who plead guilty face similar embarrassment.
Although they do not undergo the spectacle of trial, they still face the
same publicity machine that many U.S. Attorneys employ.  Moreover,
when the defendant pleads guilty, Federal Rule of Criminal
                                                                
35. This Essay does not address another big assumption that Kahan makes,
namely that prison terms of less than 18 months “offer no appreciable advantage in
deterrence or incapacitation for individuals convicted of nonviolent offenses.”
Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 384.  In my experience, the one thing “white collar”
offenders dread the most is prison, even a term of less than 18 months, and will do
almost anything to avoid it.
36. See Fed. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (requiring secrecy about the contents of grand
jury proceedings from grand jurors, interpreters, recording device operators, typists
and attorneys, but not from witnesses).
37. See Whitman, supra note 34, at 1066.  For an excellent description of the
many shaming techniques that Giuliani employed, including public arrests, press
conferences, and television talk shows, see JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
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Procedure 11(f) requires the sentencing judge to ensure that the
defendant is in fact guilty.38  In many districts, this requirement
means that the defendant, in open court and often in front of her
family and victims, must explain in detail why she is guilty of the
charged crimes, the very “contrition” that Kahan describes.39  Public
cooperation that the defendant provides, such as trial or sentencing
testimony against a coconspirator, only further shames her and
destroys what remains of her reputation.  Recall that all of this occurs
before the Guidelines come into play.
At the time of sentencing, the Guidelines permit ample
opportunity to shame the defendant, whether the defendant receives
probation or a term of imprisonment.  Section 5B1.1 authorizes
probation if the defendant’s offense level falls in the zero to twelve
month range.40  For prisoners that receive jail time, Guidelines
section 5D1.1 provides that a term of supervised release shall follow a
sentence of imprisonment of more than one year, and may follow
shorter sentences.41  The recommended conditions of probation and
supervised release are virtually identical.  Both permit the judge to
prohibit the defendant from frequenting certain places,42 to require
the defendant, as directed by the probation officer, “to notify third
parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal
record or personal history or characteristics,”43 and to prevent the
defendant “from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or
profession, or limiting the terms on which the defendant may do
so.”44  The Guidelines also permit a judge to sentence the “white
collar” offender to community service.45  Furthermore, both the
probation and the supervised release guidelines provide a catch-all
provision that permits additional conditions so long as they
reasonably relate to certain factors, including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, deterrence, and protecting the public.46  Once the court
                                                                
38. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
39. See supra Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 2, at 631-34 (describing
contrition under Kahan’s analysis).
40. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.1(a) (1999).
41. See id. § 5D1.1(b).
42. See id. §§ 5B1.3(c)(8), 5D1.3(c)(8).
43. Id. §§ 5B1.3(c)(13), 5D1.3(c)(13).
44. Id. §§ 5B1.3(e)(4), 5D1.3(e)(4), 5F1.5.
45. See id. §§ 5B1.3(e)(3), 5D1.3(e)(3).
46. See id. §§ 5B1.3(b), 5D1.3(b).  Other factors include “the need to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”  Id. § 5B1.3(b)(1)(E).  Section
5B1.3(b) also provides that the court may impose a probation condition “to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.”  Id. § 5B1.3(b)(1)(B).
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hands down its sentence, with all its special conditions, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office once again can fire up its publicity machine to tell
the world of the defendant’s evil deeds.47
Kahan argues that shaming deters recidivism by destroying the
reputation of the “white collar” defendant, thereby ensuring that no
one else falls prey to his schemes.48  Yet the probation and supervised
release conditions better dissuade a convicted criminal from
defrauding additional victims than would Kahan’s shaming proposal.
For example, a court can deny the defendant access to the tools of
her “white collar” trade, including credit lines and computers.49  The
court may prevent the defendant from associating with certain
individuals,50 or going to certain places.51  Even more effectively,
courts have restricted many “white collar” criminals from returning to
their former fraudulent trade.52  Considering that these restrictions
directly prevent the “white collar” defendant from resuming his
earlier illegal conduct, it is unclear what additional deterrence
Kahan’s publication proposal would add.
Even if Kahan’s shaming proposal is still necessary to deter “white
                                                                
47. Many U.S. Attorney’s Offices have a full time press representative to publicize
the office’s actions.
48. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
49. See United States v. Mitnick, 145 F.3d 1342, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343, at
*1 (9th Cir. May 14, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (restricting hacker’s access
to computers, computer-related equipment, and telecommunication devices,
including cellular phones); United States v. Johnson, 45 F.3d 434, Nos. 94-2525, 94-
2529, 1994 WL 589454, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 26, 1994) (unpublished table decision)
(prohibiting defendant from incurring new credit charges or opening additional
lines of credit without approval from probation officer).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843-44 (7th Cir. 1999)
(upholding restriction preventing defendant from associating with “any member or
organization which espouses violence or the supremacy of the white race”); United
States v. Jaramillo, 156 F.3d 1245, No. 98-20005, 1998 WL 536387, at *2 (10th Cir.
Aug. 18, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (upholding restriction against contact
with ex-wife and children); United States v. Wilson, 87 F.3d 1325, Nos. 95-30261, 95-
30267, 1996 WL 297616, at *2 (9th Cir. June 5, 1996) (unpublished table decision)
(upholding restriction preventing robbers, who also had a child together, from
contacting one another).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Harker, 48 F.3d 1225, No. 94-2813, 1995 WL 91886,
at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 1, 1995) (unpublished table decision) (upholding restriction
preventing defendant from patronizing establishments that primarily derive their
income from alcohol).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding
probation condition preventing defendant from working in law office or “any
institution in the business of providing legal services”); United States v. Choate, 101
F.3d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding condition of supervised release
preventing defendant from maintaining self-employment); United States v. Whitlow,
979 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding condition of supervised release
preventing defendant from working in used car industry); United States v. Burnett,
952 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding condition of supervised release
preventing defendant from working in business that requires travel or selling
vending machines).
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collar” criminals, the Guidelines already permit publication of the
defendant’s crimes.  For example, in United States v. Coenen,53 the Fifth
Circuit reviewed a shaming condition virtually identical to Kahan’s
proposal.  Douglas Coenen pleaded guilty to four counts of
transmission of child pornography.54  Special conditions of his
supervised release required him to notify the police, his neighbors,
and the school superintendent of his presence, and to publish notice
of his crime at his expense in the local newspaper once he left
prison,55 all forms of the “stigmatizing publicity” that Kahan describes.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the supervised release terms
would “shame, humiliate, and further isolate him,” but held that
under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its broad
discretion in setting forth these requirements.56  In a similar case, the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Fabiano57 upheld a condition of
supervised release requiring the defendant to register as a sex
offender under Colorado law.58
United States v. Schecter59 further demonstrates the latitude district
court judges enjoy when fashioning “shaming” conditions of
supervised release.60  Schecter, a computer consultant, pleaded guilty
to income tax evasion and willfully failing to file an income tax
return.61  In addition to his eighteen-month sentence, the district
court ordered Schecter, as a condition of supervised release, to notify
all future employers of his past criminal conduct and current status
                                                                
53. 135 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 1998).
54. See id. at 939 (describing that after the defendant pleaded guilty he was
sentenced to a jail term of 33 months).
55. See id. at 946.  Coenen’s sentence also provided that the probation officer
could require Coenen to give notice to the community, including the provision of
notice through the use of signs, handbills, bumper stickers, clothing labels, and door-
to-door oral communication, all at his own expense.  Id. at 939.  Because the
probation officer had not deemed this additional condition necessary, the Fifth
Circuit did not review it.  Id. at 946.  At least one commentator argues that
community notification requirements are not shaming sanctions.  See Stephen P.
Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 737 n.21 (1998)
(“[T]he primary aim of these sanctions is neither to shame nor educate.  Public
notification statutes appear designed primarily to protect third parties.”).  Of course,
proponents of shaming would argue that by shaming the offender, the notification
requirements make clear whom potential victims should avoid.
56. See Coenen, 135 F.3d at 946 (holding that the notification conditions were
reasonably related to Coenen’s history and characteristics, and to the nature and
circumstances of his offenses).
57. 169 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1999).
58. See id. at 1307-08; see also United States v. White, 902 F. Supp. 1347, 1353-54
(D. Kan. 1995) (requiring the defendant, who ran a daycare business, to report her
substance abuse problem to local childcare licensing agencies).
59. 13 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 1994).
60. See id. at 1118 (noting that Congress has given district courts broad discretion
in imposing special conditions of supervised release).
61. See id.
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on supervised release and to permit the Probation Department to
verify his notification.62  Schecter challenged these terms, arguing
that reference to his prior criminal background would spread to
others in the computer consultant community and effectively prevent
him from working in the computer consulting industry.63  In other
words, the terms would effectively shame him as “stigmatizing
publicity” and destroy his reputation.  Despite Schecter’s claims of
shaming, the Seventh Circuit upheld the conditions of release as
within the district court’s broad sentencing discretion.64  The Sixth
Circuit upheld a similar employer notification condition in United
States v. Ritter,65 reasoning that even though “Ritter is ashamed of his
embezzlement conviction, [that] does not mean that he should be
able to hide it from those who are particularly vulnerable to a repeat
performance.”66  The flexibility that district courts have under the
Guidelines to fashion conditions of probation and supervised release
specific to the defendant suggests that if the Hoboken urinators had
done their duty on federal property, like a post office, a federal judge
could sentence them to scrub the streets of Hoboken until they
sparkled.67
CONCLUSION
Although the Guidelines promote uniformity in sentencing, these
cases make clear that they also permit federal judges to institute many
creative conditions of probation and supervised release, including
shaming, to deal with the wide range of “white collar” criminals.
Considering that the Guidelines provide the public shaming that
Kahan desires, along with several other non-incarceration conditions
designed to stop the “white collar” criminal, Kahan’s argument
actually boils down to an old one:  incarceration is unnecessary for
“white collar” criminals.  Obviously, this is the eternal question of
“white collar” criminal justice, one that lies outside the scope of this
Essay.  Kahan believes that more empirical research is necessary to
answer questions about shaming, “white collar” criminals, and the
                                                                
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1119 (“The court did not abuse its broad discretion, when it
required Schecter to notify employers of his past criminal conduct and current status
on supervised release.”).  The Seventh Circuit recognized that the condition did not
require notification if Schecter worked as an independent contractor.  Id.
65. 118 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 506.
67. It is quite likely that a district court could sentence the urinators to swabbing
the streets of Hoboken as a form of community service.  See FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5B1.3(e)(3), 5D1.3(e)(3) (1999).
OWENSPPREVISED.DOC 6/18/2001  1:03 PM
1058 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1047
Guidelines,68 and I agree.  But before scholars conduct this empirical
research, they need to ask the right question.  The question is not
whether the Sentencing Commission should add shaming to the
Guidelines.  Rather, it is whether the Commission should remove
incarceration from the “white collar” offender equation.
                                                                
68. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 4, at 388 (outlining six areas that
econometricians could study to determine the effectiveness of shaming).
